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Abstract 
The well-known uncovered interest parity puzzle arises from the empirical regularity that, 
among developed country pairs, the high interest rate country tends to have high expected 
returns on its short term assets. At the same time, another strand of the literature has 
documented that high real interest rate countries tend to have currencies that are strong in 
real terms – indeed, stronger than can be accounted for by the path of expected real interest 
differentials under uncovered interest parity. These two strands – one concerning short-run 
expected changes and the other concerning the level of the real exchange rate – have 
apparently contradictory implications for the relationship of the foreign exchange risk 
premium and interest-rate differentials. This paper documents the puzzle, and shows that 
existing models appear unable to account for both empirical findings. The features of a 
model that might reconcile the findings are discussed. 
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0. Introduction 
This study concerns two prominent empirical findings in international finance that have achieved 
almost folkloric status.  The interest parity puzzle in foreign exchange markets finds that over 
short time horizons (from a week to a quarter) when the interest rate (one country relative to 
another) is higher than average, the securities of the high-interest rate currency tend to earn an 
excess return.  That is, the high interest rate country tends to have the higher expected return in 
the short run.  A risk-based explanation of this anomaly requires that the securities in the high-
interest rate country are relatively riskier, and therefore incorporate an excess return as a reward 
for risk-bearing. 
 The second stylized fact concerns evidence that when a country’s relative real interest 
rate rises above its average, its currency tends to be stronger than average in real terms.  
Moreover, the strength of the currency tends to be greater than is warranted by rational 
expectations of future short-term real interest differentials.  One way to rationalize this finding is 
to appeal to the influence of prospective future risk premiums on the level of the exchange rate.  
That is, the country with the relatively high real interest rate has the lower risk premium and 
hence the stronger currency.  When a country’s real interest rate rises, its currency appreciates 
not only because its assets pay a higher interest rate but also because they are less risky. 
 This paper produces evidence that confirms these empirical regularities for the exchange 
rates of the G7 countries (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan and the U.K.) relative to the 
U.S.  However, these findings, taken together, constitute a previously unrecognized puzzle 
regarding how cumulative excess returns or foreign exchange risk premiums affect the level of 
the real exchange rate.  Theoretically, a currency whose assets are perceived to be risky 
prospectively – looking forward from the near to the distant future – should be weaker, ceteris 
paribus.  The evidence cited implies that when a country’s relative real interest rate is high, the 
country’s securities are expected to yield an excess return over foreign securities in the short run; 
but, because the high-interest rate currency tends to be stronger, over longer horizons it is the 
foreign asset that is expected to yield an excess return.  This behavior of excess returns in the 
foreign exchange market poses a challenge for conventional theories of the foreign exchange risk 
premium.   
In brief, when one country’s interest rate is high, its currency tends to be stronger than 
average in real terms, it tends to keep appreciating for awhile, and then depreciates back toward 
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its long-run value.  But leading models of the forward-premium anomaly do not account for the 
behavior of the level of the real exchange rate: they predict that the high-interest rate currency 
will be weaker than average in real terms and appreciate over both the short- and long-run.  A 
risk-based explanation for the empirical regularities requires a reversal of the risk premium – the 
securities of the high-interest rate country must be relatively riskier in the short-run, but expected 
to be less risky than the other country’s securities in the more distant future.  It may be difficult 
to rationalize this pattern by focusing on the risk premium required by a single agent in each 
economy, as many theoretical models do.  Instead, a full explanation may require interaction of 
more than one type of agent and perhaps also requires introducing some sort of “stickiness” in 
the financial markets – delayed reaction to news, slow adjustment of expectations, liquidity 
constraints, momentum trading, or other sorts of imperfections. 
Figure 1, which will be explained in detail later, illustrates the point dramatically.  The 
chart plots estimates based on a vector autoregression for the U.S. relative to data constructed as 
a weighted average of the other G7 countries.  The line labeled bQj shows the estimates of the 
slope coefficient of a regression of the real exchange rate in period t+j on the U.S.-Foreign real 
interest differential in period t.  When the U.S. real interest rate is relatively high, the dollar tends 
to be strong in real terms (the real exchange rate is below its long run mean.)  Over the ensuing 
months, in the short run, the dollar on average appreciates even more when the U.S. real interest 
rate is high, before depreciating back toward its long-run mean.  The other two lines in the chart 
represent hypothetical behavior of the real exchange rate implied under two different models.  
The line labeled bRj shows how the real exchange rate would behave if uncovered interest parity 
held (based on the VAR forecasts of future real interest differentials.)  Relative to the interest 
parity norm, the actual real exchange rate behavior is notably different: when the U.S. real 
interest rate is high, (1) the real value of the dollar is stronger than implied by interest parity (the 
real exchange rate is lower); (2) the dollar continues to appreciate in the short run (while interest 
parity implies a depreciation.)  The line labeled Model illustrates the implied behavior of the real 
exchange rate in a class of models based on risk averse behavior of single agents in each 
economy.  The models have been developed to account for the uncovered interest parity puzzle – 
the depreciation of the currency that tends to accompany a relatively high Home interest rate.  
Referring to the line labeled bQj, the models are built to explain the initial negative slope of the 
line.  However, the models miss the overall picture badly, because they predict the effect of 
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interest rates on the level of real exchange rates with the wrong sign and therefore get the 
subsequent dynamics wrong as well.1 
 The literature on the forward premium anomaly is vast.  Classic early references include 
Bilson (1981) and Fama (1984).  Engel (1996) surveys the early work that establishes this 
puzzle, and discusses the problems faced by the literature that tries to account for the regularity.  
There have been many recent important contributions, including prominent papers by Backus, 
Foresi, and Telmer (2002), Lustig and Verdelhan (2007), Burnside et al. (2010a, 2010b), 
Verdelhan (2010), Bansal and Shaliastovich (2010), Backus et al. (2010).  Below, we survey the 
implications of the recent theoretical work for real exchange rate behavior. 
 Dornbusch (1976) and Frankel (1979) are the original papers to draw the link between 
real interest rates and real exchange rates in the modern, asset-market approach to exchange 
rates.  The connection has not gone unchallenged, principally because the persistence of real 
exchange rates and real interest differentials makes it difficult to establish their comovement 
with a high degree of uncertainty.  For example, Meese and Rogoff (1988) and Edison and Pauls 
(1993) treat both series as non-stationary and conclude that evidence in favor of cointegration is 
weak.  However, more recent work that examines the link between real interest rates and the real 
exchange rate, such as Engel and West (2006), Alquist and Chinn (2008), and Mark (2009), has 
tended to reestablish evidence of the empirical link.  Another approach connects surprise changes 
in real interest rates to unexpected changes in the real exchange rate.  There appears to be a 
strong link of the real exchange rate to news that alters the expected real interest differential – 
see, for example, Faust et al. (2007), Andersen et al. (2007) and Clarida and Waldman (2008).  
 The behavior of exchange rates and interest rates described here is closely associated 
with the notion of “delayed overshooting”.  The term was coined by Eichenbaum and Evans 
(1995), but is used to describe a hypothesis first put forward by Froot and Thaler (1990).  Froot 
and Thaler’s explanation of the forward premium anomaly was that when, for example, the 
Home interest rate rises, the currency appreciates as it would in a model of interest parity such as 
Dornbusch’s (1976) classic paper.  But they hypothesize that the full reaction of the market is 
delayed, perhaps because some investors are slow to react to changes in interest rates, so that the 
currency keeps on appreciating in the months immediately following the interest rate increase.  
                                                 
1   The models referred to here tend to treat the real exchange rate as nonstationary, in contrast to the evidence we 
present in section 2.  As explained below, the line in Figure 2 refers to the model’s prediction for the stationary 
component of the real exchange rate. 
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Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2010) build a model based on this intuition.  Much of the empirical 
literature that has documented the phenomenon of delayed overshooting has focused on the 
response of exchange rates to identified monetary policy shocks.2  But in the original context, the 
story was meant to apply to any shock that leads to an increase in relative interest rates.  Risk-
based explanations of the interest parity puzzle have not confronted this literature’s finding that 
high interest rate currencies are strong currencies.  Our empirical findings are consistent with 
Froot and Thaler’s hypothesis of delayed overshooting, but with one important modification.  
The empirical methods here allow us to uncover what the level of the real exchange rate would 
be if uncovered interest parity held, and to compare the actual real exchange rate with this 
notional level.  We find the level of the real exchange rate is excessively sensitive to real interest 
differentials.  That is, when a country’s real interest rate increases, its currency appreciates more 
than it would under uncovered interest parity.  Then it continues to appreciate for a number of 
months, before slowly depreciating back to its long run level. 
 Section 1 develops the approach of this paper.  Section 2 presents empirical results.  
Section 3 develops some general conditions that have to be satisfied in order to account for our 
empirical findings.  We discuss the difficulties that “representative agent” models face, and 
illustrate the problem by showing that some recent models based on non-standard preferences are 
unable to match the key facts we develop.3  In section 4, we consider various caveats to our 
findings.  Finally, in the concluding section, we discuss features of models that may be able to 
account for these empirical regularities.  
 
1. Excess Returns and Real Exchange Rates 
We develop here a framework for examining behavior of excess returns and the level of the real 
exchange rate.  The approach developed here is essentially mechanical.  We relate the concepts 
here to economic theories of risk and return in section 3. 
 Our set-up will consider a Home and Foreign country.  In the empirical work of section 2, 
we always take the US as the Home country (as does the vast majority of the literature), and 
                                                 
2 See, for example, Eichenbaum and Evans (1995), Kim and Roubini (2000), Faust and Rogers (2003), Scholl and 
Uhlig (2008), and Bjornland (2009).  
3  “Representative agent models” may be an inadequate label for models of the risk premium that are developed off 
of the Euler equation of agents with the minimum variance stochastic discount factor, generally taking the 
consumption stream as exogenous. 
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consider other major economies as the Foreign country.  Let ti  be the one period nominal 
interest in Home.  We denote Foreign variables throughout with a superscript *, so *ti  is the 
Foreign interest rate.  ts  denotes the log of the foreign exchange rate, expressed as the Home 
currency price of Foreign currency.  1t tE s   refers to the expectation, conditional on time t 
information, of the log of the spot exchange rate at time 1t  .  We define the “excess return”, t , 
as: 
(1) * 1t t t t t ti E s s i     . 
 This definition of excess returns corresponds with the definition in the literature.  We can 
interpret * 1t t t ti E s s   as a first-order log approximation of the expected return in Home 
currency terms for a Foreign security.  As Engel (1996) notes, the first-order log approximation 
may not really be adequate for appreciating the implications of economic theories of the excess 
return.  For example, if the exchange rate is conditionally log normally distributed, then 
  11 1 12ln ( / ) var ( )t t t t t t t tE S S E s s s     , where 1var ( )t ts   refers to the conditional variance of the 
log of the exchange rate.  Engel (1996) points out that this second-order term is approximately 
the same order of magnitude as the risk premiums implied by some economic models.  However, 
we proceed with analysis of t  defined according to equation (1) both because it is the object of 
almost all of the empirical analysis of excess returns in foreign exchange markets, and because 
the theoretical literature that we consider in section 3 seeks to explain t  as defined above 
including possible movements in 1var ( )t ts  . 
 The well-known uncovered interest parity puzzle comes from the empirical finding that 
the change in the log of the exchange rate is negatively correlated with the Home less Foreign 
interest differential, *t ti i .  That is, estimates of * *1 1cov( , ) cov( , )t t t t t t t t ts s i i E s s i i       tend 
to be negative.  As Engel (1996) surveys, and subsequent empirical work confirms, this finding 
is consistent over time among pairs of high-income, low-inflation countries.4  From equation (1), 
we note that the relationship *1cov( , ) 0t t t t tE s s i i     is equivalent to 
* *cov( , ) var( ) 0t t t t ti i i i      .  That is, when the Home interest rate is relatively high, so *t ti i  
                                                 
4   Bansal and Dahlquist (2000) find that the relationship is not as consistent among emerging market countries, 
especially those with high inflation. 
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is above average, the excess return on Home assets also tends to be above average: t  is below 
average.  This is considered a puzzle because it has been very difficult to find plausible 
economic models that can account for this relationship. 
 Let tp  denote the log of the consumer price index at Home, and 1 1t t tp p     is the 
inflation rate.  The log of the real exchange rate is defined as *t t t tq s p p   .  The ex ante real 
one-period interest rates, Home and Foreign, are given by 1t t t tr i E     and * * * 1t t t tr i E   .  
Note also *1 1 1 1t t t t t t t t t tE q q E s s E E         .  We can rewrite (1) as: 
(2) * 1t t t t t tr r E q q     . 
We take as uncontroversial the proposition that the real interest differential, *t tr r , and excess 
returns, t , are stationary random variables without time trends, and denote their means as r  
and  , respectively.  We will also stipulate that there is no deterministic time trend or drift in the 
log of real exchange rates, so that the unconditional mean of 1t t tE q q   is zero.  Rewriting (2): 
(3) *1 ( ) ( )t t t t t tq E q r r r         . 
 Iterate equation (3) forward, applying the law of iterated expectations, to get: 
(4)  limt t t j t tjq E q R    , 
where 
(5) *
0
( )t t t j t j
j
R E r r r

 

   , and 
(6) 
0
( )t t t j
j
E   

   . 
We label tR  as the “prospective real interest differential”.  It is the expected sum of the 
current and all future values of the Home less Foreign real interest differential (relative to its 
unconditional mean).  It is important to note that tR  is not the real interest differential on long-
term bonds, even hypothetical infinite-horizon bonds.  tR  is the difference between the real 
return from holding an infinite sequence of short-term Home bonds and the real return from the 
infinite sequence of short-term Foreign bonds.  An investment that involves rolling over short 
term assets has different risk characteristics than holding a long-term asset.  Hence we coin the 
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phrase “prospective” real interest differential to avoid the trap of calling tR  the long-term real 
interest differential. 
Similarly, t  is the expected infinite sum of excess returns on the Foreign security.  We 
label this the “prospective excess return”. 
The left-hand side of (4),  limt t t jjq E q  , can be interpreted as the transitory component 
of the real exchange rate.  In fact, according to our empirical findings reported in section 2, we 
can treat the real exchange rate as a stationary variable, so  lim t t jj E q q  .  As is well known, 
even if the real exchange rate is stationary, it is very persistent.  Engel (2000), in fact, argues that 
it may be practically impossible to distinguish between the stationary case and the unit root case 
under plausible economic conditions.  We proceed in examining tq q , assuming stationarity, 
but note that our methods could be applied to the transitory component of the real exchange rate, 
taken as the difference between tq  and a measure of the permanent component,  lim t t jj E q  .  In 
section 4, we note how Engel’s (2000) interpretation implies that in practice it may not be 
possible to distinguish a permanent and transitory component, but make the case that the 
economic analysis of that paper argues for treating the real exchange rate as stationary. 
In section 3, we discuss the common assumption in theoretical models of excess returns 
that the real exchange rate is equal to the difference between the marginal utility of a (particular) 
Home consumer and (particular) Foreign consumer.  We note here that stationarity of the real 
exchange rate is completely compatible with a unit root in the log of consumption, or in the 
marginal utility of consumption.  It requires simply that Home and Foreign marginal utilities of 
consumption be cointegrated, which is a natural condition among well-integrated economies 
such as the highly developed countries used in this study.  It is analogous to the assumption made 
in almost all closed-economy models that we can treat the marginal utilities of different 
consumers within a country as cointegrated.   
Under the stationarity assumption, we can write (4) as: 
(7) t t tq q R    . 
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From this formulation, we see that the prospective excess return, t , captures the potential effect 
of risk premiums on the level of the real exchange rate, holding the prospective real interest 
differential constant. 
 In the next section, we present evidence that *cov( , ) 0 t t tR r r  and *cov( , ) 0  t t tr r .  
Taken together, these two findings imply from (7) that *cov( , ) 0 t t tq r r , which jibes with the 
concept familiar from Dornbusch (1976) and Frankel (1979) that when a country’s real interest 
rate is high (relative to the foreign real interest rate, relative to average), its currency tends to be 
strong in real terms (relative to average.)  But if *cov( , ) 0  t t tr r , the strength of the currency 
cannot be attributed entirely to the prospective real interest differential, as it would be in 
Dornbusch and Frankel (who both assume uncovered interest parity, or that 0t  .)  The 
relationship between excess returns and real interest differential plays a role in determining the 
relation between the real exchange rate and real interest rates. 
 It is entirely unsurprising that we find *cov( , ) 0 t t tR r r .  This simply implies that there 
is not a great deal of non-monotonicity in the adjustment of real interest rates toward the long run 
mean. 
The central puzzle raised by this paper concerns the two findings, *cov( , ) 0t t tr r    and 
*cov( , ) 0  t t tr r .  The short-run excess return on the Foreign security, t , is negatively 
correlated with the real interest differential, consistent with the many empirical papers on the 
uncovered interest parity puzzle.  But the prospective excess return, t , is positively correlated.  
Given the definition of t  in equation (6), we must have that for at least 0j   and possibly for 
some 0j  , *cov( , ) 0t t j t tE r r    , but for other 0j  , *cov( , ) 0t t j t tE r r    .  The sum of the 
latter covariances must exceed the sum of the former to generate *cov( , ) 0  t t tr r .  As we 
discuss in section 3, our risk premium models of excess return are not up to the task of 
explaining this finding.  In fact, while they are constructed to account for *cov( , ) 0t t tr r   , they 
have the counterfactual implication that *cov( , ) 0  t t tr r .   
The empirical approach of this paper can be described simply.  We estimate VARs in the 
variables tq , 
*
t ti i , and * *1 1 ( )t t t ti i      .  From the VAR estimates, we construct measures of 
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 * * *1 1( )t t t t t t tE i i r r       .  Using standard projection formulas, we can also construct 
estimates of tR .  To measure t , we take the difference of tq q  and tR .  From these VAR 
estimates, we calculate our estimates of the covariances just discussed.  As an alternative 
approach, we estimate VARs in tq , 
*
t ti i , and *t t  , and then construct the needed estimates 
of *t tr r , tR , and t .  The estimated covariances under this alternative approach are very 
similar to those from the original VAR.  Our approach of estimating undiscounted expected 
present values of interest rates from VARs is presaged in Mark (2009) and Brunnermeier et al. 
(2009). 
 
2. Empirical Results 
We investigate the behavior of real exchange rates and interest rates for the U.S. relative to the 
other six countries of the G7: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and the U.K.  We also 
consider the behavior of U.S. variables relative to an aggregate weighted average of the variables 
from these six countries.5  Our study uses monthly data.  Foreign exchange rates are noon buying 
rates in New York, on the last trading day of each month, culled from the daily data reported in 
the Federal Reserve historical database.  The price levels are consumer price indexes from the 
Main Economic Indicators on the OECD database.  Nominal interest rates are taken from the last 
trading day of the month, and are the midpoint of bid and offer rates for one-month Eurorates, as 
reported on Intercapital from Datastream.  The interest rate data begin in June 1979.  Most of our 
empirical work uses the time period June 1979 to October 2009.  In some of the tests for a unit 
root in real exchange rates, reported below, we use a longer time span from June 1973 to October 
2009.  It is important for our purposes to include these data well into 2009 because it has been 
noted in some recent papers that there was a crash in the “carry trade” in 2008, so it would 
perhaps bias our findings if our sample ended prior to this crash.6 
 
                                                 
5 The weights are determined by the value of each country’s exports and imports as a fraction of the average value of 
trade over the six countries.   
6 See, for example, Brunnermeier, et al. (2009) and Jordà and Taylor (2009). 
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2.1 Tests for unit root in real exchange rates 
It is well known that real exchange rates among advanced countries are very persistent.7  There is 
no consensus on whether these real exchange rates are stationary or have a unit root.  Two recent 
studies of uncovered interest parity, Mark (2010) and Brunnermeier, et al. (2009) estimate 
statistical models that assume the real exchange rate is stationary, but do not test for stationarity.  
Jordà and Taylor (2010) demonstrate that there is a profitable carry-trade strategy that exploits 
the uncovered interest parity puzzle when the trading rule is enhanced by including a forecast 
that the real exchange rate will return to its long-run level when its deviations from the mean are 
large.  That paper assumes a stationary real exchange rate and includes statistical tests that 
cannot reject cointegration of ts  with 
*
t tp p .  However, that study does not indicate whether the 
cointegrating vector is insignificantly different than [1,-1], so the tests are not equivalent to a test 
for a unit root in tq . 
 We present evidence here that favors the hypothesis of no unit root in the real exchange 
rate.  Clearly the real exchange rate is very persistent, and the evidence in favor of stationarity is 
not incontrovertible. 
 Table 1 presents standard ADF tests for a unit root.  The null is not rejected for any 
currency except the U.K. pound at the 10 percent level.  The table also includes tests for a unit 
root based on the GLS test proposed by Elliott et al. (1996).  These tests show stronger evidence 
against a unit root – the null is rejected at the 5% level for three currencies, at the 10% level for 
two others, and not rejected for the Canadian dollar or Japanese yen.  However, the test statistic 
is based on the assumption that there may be a trend in the real exchange rate under the 
alternative, which is not a realistic assumption for these real exchange rates.   
 We next follow much of the recent literature on testing for a unit root in real exchange 
rates by exploiting the power from panel estimation.  The lower panel of Table 1 reports 
estimates from a panel model.  The null model in this test is: 
(8) 1 1
1
( )
ik
it it i i it j it j it
j
q q c q q    

     . 
                                                 
7 See Rogoff (1996) for example. 
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Under the null, the change in the real exchange rate for country i follows an autoregressive 
process of order ik .  Note that the parameters and the lag lengths can be different across the 
currencies.  Under the alternative: 
(9) 1 1 1
1
( )
ik
it it i it i it j it j it
j
q q q c q q      

      , 
with a common   for the currencies. 
 We estimate   for the six currencies from (9).8  We find the lag length for each currency 
by first estimating a univariate version of (9), and using the BIC criterion.  The estimated value 
of   is reported in the lower panel of Table 1, in the row labeled “no covariates”.   
 This table also reports the bootstrapped distribution of  .  The bootstrap is constructed 
by estimating (8), then saving the residuals for the six real exchange rates for each time period.  
We then construct 5000 artificial time series (each of length 440, corresponding to our sample of 
440 months) for the real exchange rate by resampling the residuals and using the estimates from 
(8) to parameterize the model. 
 The lower panel of Table 1, in the row labeled “no covariates” reports certain points of 
the distribution of   from the bootstrap.  We see that we can reject the null of a unit root at the 5 
percent level. 
 We also consider a version of the panel test in which we include covariates.  Specifically, 
we investigate the possibility that the inflation differential (with the U.S.) helps account for the 
dynamics of the real exchange rate.  We follow the same procedure as above, but add lagged 
own relative inflation terms to equation (9).  To generate the distribution of the estimate of  , 
we estimate a VAR in the change in the real exchange rate (as in (8)) and the inflation rate.  For 
each country, the real exchange rate and inflation rates depend only on own-country lags under 
the null.  The bootstrap proceeds as in the model with no covariates.   
 The bottom panel of Table 1 reports the estimated   and its distribution for the model 
with covariates in the row labeled “with covariates”.  Adding covariates does not alter the 
conclusion that we can reject a unit root at the 5 percent level. 
 Based on these tests, we will proceed to treat the real exchange rate as stationary, though 
we note that the evidence favoring stationarity is thin for the Canadian dollar and Japanese yen 
real exchange rates.
                                                 
8 We do not include the average G6 real exchange rate as a separate real exchange rate in this test. 
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2.2 Fama regressions 
Table 2 reports results from the standard “Fama regression” that is the basis for the forward 
premium puzzle.  The change in the log of the exchange rate between time t+1 and t is regressed 
on the time t interest differential: 
(10) *1 , 1( )      t t s s t t s ts s i i u . 
Under uncovered interest parity, 0 s  and 1 s .  
 We can rewrite this regression as: 
 * *1 , 1( ) (1 )( )          t t t t s s t t s ti i s s i i u . 
The left-hand side of the regression is the ex post excess return on the home security.  If 0 s  
but 1 s , then the high-interest rate currency tends to have a higher excess return.  There is a 
positive correlation between the excess return on the Home currency and the Home-Foreign 
interest differential. 
The Table reports the 90% confidence interval for the regression coefficients, based on 
Newey-West standard errors.  For five of the six currencies, the point estimate of s  is negative 
(Italy being the exception).  Of those five, the 90% confidence interval for s  lies below one for 
four (France being the exception, where the confidence interval barely includes one.)  For four of 
the six, zero is inside the 90% confidence interval for  s .  (In the case of the U.K., the 
confidence interval barely excludes zero, while for Japan we find strong evidence that  s  is 
greater than zero.) 
The G6 exchange rate (the weighted average exchange rate, defined in the data section) 
appears to be less noisy than the individual exchange rates.  In all of our tests, the standard errors 
of the coefficient estimates are smaller for the G6 exchange rate than for the individual country 
exchange rates, suggesting that some idiosyncratic movements in country exchange rates gets 
smoothed out when we look at averages.  Table 2 reports that the 90% confidence interval for 
this exchange rate lies well below one, with a point estimate of -1.467.9     
 
                                                 
9 The intercept coefficient, on the other hand is very near zero, and the 90% confidence interval easily contains zero. 
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2.3 Fama regressions in real terms 
The Fama regression in real terms can be written as: 
(11) *1 , 1ˆ ˆ( )      t t q q t t q tq q r r u . 
 In this regression, *ˆ ˆt tr r   refers to estimates of the ex ante real interest rate differential, 
* * *
1 1( )t t t t t t t tr r i E i E        and.  We estimate the real interest rate from VARs.  As noted 
above, we consider two different VAR models.  Model 1 is a VAR with 3 lags in the variables tq
, *t ti i , and * *1 1 ( )t t t ti i      .  From the VAR estimates, we construct measures of 
 * * *1 1( )t t t t t t tE i i r r       .  Model 2 is a 3-lag VAR in tq , *t ti i , and *t t  . 
 There are two senses in which our measures of *ˆ ˆt tr r  are estimates.  The first is that the 
parameters of the VAR are estimated.  But even if the parameters were known with certainty, we 
would still only have estimates of *t tr r  because we are basing our measures of  *t tr r  on linear 
projections.  Agents certainly have more sophisticated methods of calculating expectations, and 
use more information than is contained in our VAR. 
The findings for the Fama regression in real terms are similar to those when the 
regression is estimated on nominal variables.  For four of the six currencies, the estimates of q , 
reported in Table 3A, are negative, and all are less than one.  In addition, the estimated 
coefficient for the G6 aggregate is close to -1.  This summary is true for both VAR models.  
 Table 3A reports three sets of confidence intervals.  All of the subsequent tables also 
report three sets of confidence intervals for each parameter estimate.  The first is based on 
Newey-West standard errors, ignoring the fact that *ˆ ˆt tr r  is a generated regressor.  The second 
two are based on bootstraps.  The first bootstrap uses percentile intervals and the second 
percentile-t intervals.10 
 From Table 3A, all three sets of confidence intervals are similar.  For the individual currencies, 
for both Model 1 and Model 2, the confidence interval for q  lies below one for Germany, Japan, and 
the U.K.  It contains one for Canada and Italy, and contains one for France except using the 
second confidence interval. 
                                                 
10 See Hansen (2010).  The Appendix describes the bootstraps in more detail. 
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 The findings are clear using the G6 average exchange rate: the coefficient estimate is 
0.93  when the real interest estimate comes from Model 1, and 0.91 .  All of the confidence 
intervals lie below one, though they all contain zero.  For both models, the estimate of  q  is very 
close to zero, and all confidence intervals contain zero. 
 In summary, the evidence on the interest parity puzzle is similar in real terms as in 
nominal terms.  The estimate of the coefficient q , tends to be negative and there is strong 
evidence that it is less than one.  Even in real terms, the country with the higher interest rate 
tends to have short-run excess returns (i.e., excess returns and the interest rate differential are 
positively correlated.) 
 The Fama regression finds a strong negative correlation between 1t ts s   and *t ti i .  It is 
well known that for the currencies of low-inflation, high-income countries, 1t ts s   is highly 
correlated with 1t tq q  , which suggests 1t tq q   is negatively correlated with *t ti i .  Since 
* * *
1 1( )t t t t t ti i r r E        , for exploratory reasons we consider a regression of 1t tq q   on 
*ˆ ˆt tr r  and *1 1ˆ ( )t t tE    , where the latter is our measure of the expected inflation differential 
generated from the VARs.  These regressions are reported in Table 3B.  Specifically, Table 3B 
reports the estimation of: 
(12) * *1 1 2 1 1 , 1ˆˆ ˆ( ) ( )             t t q q t t q t t t q tq q r r E u . 
 The estimates of 1q  tend to be negative, and generally more negative than those 
reported in Table 3A for equation (11).  The real surprise from Table 3b is that the estimates of 
2q  are negative for all currencies in both models.  Though they are not always significantly 
negative individually, and we do not calculate a test of their joint significance, it is nonetheless 
telling that all of the coefficient estimates are negative.  This implies that the currency of the 
country that is expected to have relatively high inflation is expected to appreciate in real terms.  
We return to this finding in section 5. 
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2.4 The real exchange rate, real interest rates, and the level risk premium 
Table 4 reports estimates from  
(13) * ,ˆ ˆ( )    t q q t t q tq r r u . 
In all cases (all currencies, for both Model 1 and Model 2), the coefficient estimate is negative.  
In virtually all cases, although the confidence intervals are wide, the coefficient is significantly 
negative.11 
 Recall from equation (7) that t t tq q R    , where *
0
( )t t t j t j
j
R E r r r

 

    and 
0
( )t t t j
j
E   

   .  If there were no excess returns, so that t tq q R   ,  and *ˆ ˆt tr r  were 
positively correlated with tR , then there is a negative correlation between tq  and 
*ˆ ˆt tr r .  That is, 
under uncovered interest parity, the high real interest rate currency tends to be stronger.  For 
example, this is the implication of the Dornbusch-Frankel theory in which real interest 
differentials are determined in a sticky-price monetary model. 
 But we can make a stronger statement – there is a relationship between the real interest 
differential, *ˆ ˆt tr r , and our measure of the level risk premium, ˆ t  (where ˆ t  is our estimate of 
t  based on the VAR models.)  Our central empirical finding is reported in Table 5.  This table 
reports the regression: 
(14) *ˆ ˆ ˆ( )       t t t tr r u .12 
In all cases, the estimated slope coefficient is positive.  The 90 percent confidence intervals are 
wide, but with a few exceptions, lie above zero.  The confidence for the G6 average strongly 
excludes zero.  To get an idea of magnitudes, a one percentage point difference in annual rates 
between the home and foreign real interest rates equals a 1/12th percentage point difference in 
monthly rates.  The coefficient of around 32 reported for the regression when we take the U.S. 
relative to the average of the other G7 countries translates into around a 2.7% effect on the level 
risk premium.  That is, if the U.S. real rate increases one annualized percentage point above the 
                                                 
11  The exceptions are that the third confidence interval contains zero for Model 1 for France, and Models 1 and 2 for 
the U.K. 
12  To be precise, ˆ t   is calculated as the difference between tq  and our VAR estimate of tR .  To calculate our 
estimate of tR , given by the infinite sum of equation (5), we demean 
*
t j t jr r   by its sample mean.  We use the 
sample mean rather than maximum likelihood estimate of the mean because it tends to be a more robust estimate. 
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real rate in the other countries, the dollar is predicted to be 2.7% stronger in real terms from the 
level risk premium effect. 
 This finding is surprising in light of the well-known uncovered interest parity puzzle.  In 
the previous two subsections, we have documented that when *t tr r  is above average, the Home 
currency tends to have excess returns.  That seems to imply that the high interest rate currency is 
the riskier currency.  But the estimates from equation (14) deliver the opposite message – the 
high interest rate currency has the lower level risk premium.  t  is the level risk premium for the 
Foreign currency – it is positively correlated with *t tr r , so it tends to be high when *t tr r  is 
low. 
 Recall that the level risk premium is defined in equation (6) as 
0
( )t t t j
j
E   

   .  We 
have then that 
(15) * *
0
cov( , ) cov[ ( ), ]t t t t t j t t
j
r r E r r 

    . 
The short-run interest parity puzzle establishes that *cov( , ) 0t t tr r   .  Clearly if 
*cov( , ) 0t t tr r   , then we must have *cov[ ( ), ] 0t t j t tE r r     for at least some 0j  .  That is, 
in order for *cov( , ) 0t t tr r   , we must have a reversal in the correlation of the short-run risk 
premiums with *t tr r  as the horizon extends. 
 This is illustrated in Figure 2, which plots estimates of the slope coefficient in a 
regression of 1ˆ ( )t t jE     on *ˆ ˆt tr r  for 1, ,100j  K : 
 * ,1 ( )ˆ ( )           jj j t tt tt j r rE u  
For the first few j, this coefficient is negative, but it eventually turns positive at longer horizons. 
 The Figure also plots the slope of regressions of *1 1ˆ ( )t t j t jE r r     on *ˆ ˆt tr r  for 
1, ,100j  K :   
 * *1 1 ,ˆ ( ) ( )         jt t j t j rj rj t t r tE r r r r u  
These tend to be positive at all horizons.  
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 The Figure also includes a plot of the slope coefficients from regressing 1ˆ ( )t t j t jE q q    for 
1, ,100j  K :   
 *1 ,ˆ ( ) ( )        jt t j t j qj qj t t q tE q q r r u  
Since *1 1 1 1ˆˆ ˆ( ) ( () )t t j t j t t j t tj t jE q q EE r r             , these regression coefficients are simply the 
sum of the other two regression coefficients that are plotted.  In this case, the regression 
coefficients start out negative for the first few months, but then turn positive for longer horizons. 
 To summarize, when the Home real interest rate relative to the Foreign real interest rate is 
higher than average, the Home currency is stronger in real terms than average.  Crucially, it is 
even stronger than would be predicted by a model of uncovered interest parity.  Excess returns or 
the foreign exchange risk premium contribute to this strength.  If Home’s real interest rate is high 
– in the sense that the Home relative to Foreign real interest rate is higher than average – the 
level risk premium on the Foreign security is higher than average.   
We can project the future path of the real exchange rate when Home real interest rates are 
high using the facts that the currency tends to be stronger than average (the finding of regression 
(14)), that it continues to appreciate in the short run (the famous puzzle, confirmed in the 
findings from regression (11)), and that the real exchange rate is stationary so it is expected to 
return to its unconditional mean (established in Table 1.)  When the Home real interest rate is 
high, the Home currency is strong in real terms, and expected to get stronger in the short run.  
However, eventually it must be expected to depreciate back to its long run level. 
One implication of these dynamics is similar to Jorda and Taylor’s (2009) findings about 
forecasting nominal exchange rate changes.  They find that the nominal interest differential can 
help to predict exchange rate changes in the short run: the high interest rate currency is expected 
to appreciate (contrary to the predictions of uncovered interest parity.)  But the forecasts of the 
exchange rate can be enhanced by taking into account purchasing power parity considerations.  
The deviation from PPP helps predict movements of the nominal exchange rate as the real 
exchange rate adjusts toward its long-run level. 
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Figure 1 presents a slightly different perspective.  This chart plots the slope coefficients 
from regressions of ˆt jR   and t jq   on *t tr r  for the G6 average exchange rate.13  That is, it plots 
the estimated slope coefficients from the regressions: 
*
,
ˆ ( )      jt j Rj Rj t t R tR r r u  
*
,( )      jt j Qj Qj t t Q tq r r u . 
If interest parity held, the behavior of the real exchange rate should conform to the plot 
for ˆt jR  .  That line indicates that the U.S. dollar tends to be strong in real terms when *t tr r  is 
high, and then is expected to depreciate back toward its long-run mean.  The line for the 
regression of t jq   on 
*
t tr r  shows three things:  First, when *t tr r  is above average, the dollar 
tends to be strong in real terms, and much stronger than would be implied under uncovered 
interest parity.  Second, when *t tr r  is above average, the dollar is expected to appreciate even 
more in the short run.  This is the uncovered interest parity puzzle.  Third, when *t tr r  is above 
average, the dollar is expected to reach its maximum appreciation after around 5 months, then to 
depreciate gradually.  The line labeled “Model” is discussed in the next section. 
 We turn now to the implications of these empirical findings for models of the foreign 
exchange risk premium. 
 
3. The Risk Premium 
The problem facing most models of the risk premium stem from treating the interest differential 
as if it contains all relevant information for forecasting the exchange rate.  That is, the Fama 
regression equation (11) is treated as though it determines conditional expectations: 
(16) *1 ( )     t t t q q t tE q q r r . 
If this interpretation were correct, then from equation (2), the risk premium is perfectly 
correlated to the real interest differential: 
(17) ** 1 ( 1)( )        t t t t t t q q t tq rE q rr r . 
                                                 
13   The plots for most of the other real exchange rates look qualitatively very similar. 
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The uncovered interest rate parity puzzle finds 1 q , so (17) implies t  and *t tr r  are perfectly 
negatively correlated.  It follows that, under this approach, *
0
( )t t t j t j
j
R E r r r

 

    and 
0
( )t t t j
j
E   

    are perfectly negatively correlated.  Since real interest rates are strongly 
positively serially correlated, so *cov( , ) 0 t t tR r r , equation (17) must imply *cov( , ) 0  t t tr r  
if 1 q .  But the evidence of Table 5 shows the opposite, that *cov( , ) 0  t t tr r .  The 
assumption embodied in equation (16) which is implicit or explicit in much of the literature rules 
out our key empirical finding – that the correlation of the short-run risk premium and the level 
risk premium with *t tr r are of opposite signs.  In fact, usually we find models working off the 
stronger condition that 0 q .  Then there is a stronger implication.  Iterating equation (16) 
forward, 
(18)   t q tq q R . 
Then we must have that the real exchange rate, tq , is perfectly positively correlated with tR .  
Given the strong positive serial correlation of real interest rates, this implies we must have 
*cov( , ) 0t t tr r q  .  That is, we must have a positive correlation of the real interest differential 
with the real exchange rate, which contradicts the empirical evidence.   
 Thus two strands of the international finance literature are in conflict.  The models of the 
uncovered interest parity puzzle (interpreted as finding 0 q ) that rely on the implicit 
assumption of equation (16) necessarily are at loggerheads with the literature that finds a 
currency tends to be stronger in real terms when its relative real interest rate is above the long-
run average. 
 Figure 1 illustrates the problem.  As already noted, this chart plots the slope coefficients 
from regressions of ˆt jR   and t jq   on *t tr r  for the G6 average exchange rate – these are the 
lines labeled bRj and bQj, respectively.  The third line, labeled Model, is an example of the 
theoretical regression coefficients of  lim   t t kkt j E qq  on *t tr r  implied by the models of the 
risk premium built off of the behavior of a single agent in each of the Home and Foreign 
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economies that are discussed below in section 3.3. 14  The models are built to account for the 
empirical finding that the Home currency tends to appreciate in the short run when the home 
interest rate is high.  But the models leave the correlation of the level of the real exchange rate 
and the real interest differential with the wrong sign, and imply monotonic adjustment rather 
than the hump-shaped dynamics apparent in the data. 
 Subsequently, we use the notation 1t t t tE q q    for the expected rate of real 
depreciation, and *  dt t tr r r r  for the Home less Foreign short-term real interest differential.  
In essence, the assumption underlying equation (16) is that a single factor drives t  and dtr : 
(19) 1 1t ta   
(20) 1 1 t tg  
(21) 1 1
d
t tr c , 1 1 1 c a g  
so that  
(22) 1
1
  d dt t q ta r rc , 
as in equation (16).15  Without loss of generality, we will assume 1var( ) 1 t  and 1 0a . 
 A model that allows the short-run risk premium and level risk premium to covary with 
the real interest differential with opposite signs requires a model with at least two factors.  
However, while two factors are necessary, they are not sufficient.  
 As Fama noted, the finding of a negative coefficient in the “Fama regression” (10) 
implies that the variance of the risk premium is greater than the variance of expected 
depreciation: var( ) var( ) t t .  The single-agent models of the risk premium have been built to 
embody this property.  When there is a single factor driving the risk premium and expected 
depreciation, we must have 1 1g a .  This condition is necessary for the slope coefficient in (22), 
1 1
1 1 1
 
a a
c a g
, to be negative.   
 The models are constructed, in other words, so that the risk premium responds more to 
the exogenous factor driving risk and returns than does the expected rate of depreciation.  Now 
                                                 
14  This line refers to the implied slope coefficient in the regression of  limt i t t jjq E q   on dtr  
15  We drop the constant terms hereinafter because they play no role in explaining the puzzles. 
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we show that a two-factor model can potentially account for the empirical findings.  However, 
the risk premium must respond less to this new, second factor, than expected depreciation.  Yet 
this factor that is missing from current models must, in a sense, be the primary factor driving the 
relationship between the real exchange rate and the real interest differential.   
 
3.1  A two-factor model 
The problem arises from the fact that while cov( , ) 0 dt tr , we have cov( , ) 0  dt t j tE r  for large 
enough j.  In order to account for this, we need a model that allows at least two factors to drive 
real interest rates and risk premiums: 
(23) 1 1 2 2t t ta a     
(24) 1 1 2 2t t tg g     
(25) 1 1 2 2
d
t t tr c c    1 1 1 g a c , 2 2 2 g a c . 
1 t  and 2 t  are independent.  Without loss of generality, we assume 1 2, 0a a , and 
1 2var( ) var( ) 1  t t . 
Using these equations, we get: 
(26) 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 2 2 2cov( , ) ( ) ( )      dt tr a c a c a a g a a g  
Models of the uncovered interest parity puzzle are designed to account for cov( , ) 0 dt tr .  
Given our normalizations, this requires either 1 1g a  or 2 2g a .   
 Define 1 1 1
0
( )  

  t t t j
j
E and 1 1 1
0
( )  

  t t t j
j
E Iterating (24) forward: 
(27) 1 1 2 2    t t tg g . 
We find: 
(28) 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2cov( , ) ( ) cov( , ) ( ) cov( , )       dt t t t t tr a g g a g g . 
Models typically assume positive serial correlation in the macroeconomic factors driving returns, 
so they have 1 1cov( , ) 0  t t  and 2 2cov( , ) 0  t t .  For example, these conditions would be 
necessary for equation (25) to account for the real interest differential given that we see 
cov( , ) 0dt tR r .  We have established that cov( , ) 0 dt tr  requires either 1 1g a  or 2 2g a .  
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Since we have normalized 1 2, 0a a , then letting 1 1g a , our finding that cov( , ) 0 dt tr  
requires 2 20  g a . 
 This condition is necessary for finding cov( , ) 0 dt tr , but we also need that 2 t  is more 
persistent than 1 t .  Comparing (26) and (28), we also must have 2 2 1 1cov( , ) cov( , )   t t t t  
 The conclusion that 2 20  g a  is necessary is a serious challenge for the literature’s 
models of risk premiums based on risk aversion of a representative agent.  Those models 
formulate preferences in order to generate volatile risk premiums.  Volatile risk premiums are 
important not only for understanding the uncovered interest parity puzzle, but also a number of 
other puzzles in asset pricing regarding returns on equities and the term structure.16  In the single 
factor models, the condition that 1 1g a  delivers the necessary variation in the risk premium.  
The models are designed in such a way that the risk premium, t , loads more heavily on the 
exogenous state variables that drive returns than does the expected rate of depreciation,  t .  The 
problem is that the condition 2 20  g a  requires that the risk premium respond less to 2 t  than 
does expected depreciation.  As we will now see, these conditions have conflicting requirements 
for the behavior of the moments of the stochastic discount factors of representative agents. 
 
3.2 Background on the foreign exchange risk premium 
Here we briefly review the basic theory of foreign exchange risk premiums.  See, for example, 
Backus et al. (2001) or Brandt et al. (2004).   
Let 1tM   be the stochastic discount factor for returns in units of Home consumption – the 
intertemporal marginal rate of substitution between 1t and t for Home.  Let * 1tM   be the 
corresponding discount factor for returns denominated in units of Foreign consumption.  Lower 
case is log of upper case.   
The first-order condition for Home agents for the riskless Home real asset is 
(29) 11 t
r
t te E M  . 
Under log normality 
 
1
1 11 2 vart t t tt E m mm
tE e e  
 , which gives us 
                                                 
16 See for example Bansal and Yaron (2004). 
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(30) 11 12 vart t t t tr E m m     
We also have 
(31) 
*
1 11 t
r
t t te E M D  ,  
(where 1 1 / t t tD Q Q and we use 1 1  t t td q q ), and so we get: 
(32) * 1 11 1 1 1 1 12 2var var cov ( , )t t t t t t t t t t t tr E m E d m d m d           . 
Taking differences, we get 
(33) * 11 1 1 12 var cov ( , )        t t t t t t t t t tr r E d d m d . 
 Following similar steps for the Foreign investor, using the discount factor for Foreign 
units, we get: 
(34) * *11 1 1 12 var cov ( , )        t t t t t t t t t tr r E d d m d . 
 Equation (33) must hold for Home agents, and (34) for Foreign agents.  The intuition of 
the foreign exchange risk premium, however, is complicated by the Jensen’s inequality terms 
involving 1vart td  , which enter the two equations with opposite signs because Home and Foreign 
households evaluate returns in different units (Home in terms of the Home consumption basket, 
Foreign in units of the Foreign consumption basket.)  Intuition is aided by taking a simple 
average of these two equations: 
(35) 
*
1 1
1cov ( , )2
     t tt t tm m d . 
As with any asset, the excess return is determined by the covariance of the return with the 
stochastic discount factor.  If the foreign exchange return, 1td   is positively correlated with the 
Home discount factor, 1tm  , Home investors require a compensation for risk so the Foreign 
security has an excess return relative to the Home bond.  For Foreign investors, the foreign 
exchange return on a Home bond is 1td  .  If 1td   is positively correlated with the Foreign 
discount factor, * 1tm  , the Home asset is relatively risky, implying a lower excess return on the 
Foreign bond.   
 This simplifies under complete markets.  Then 
(36) *1 1 1t t td m m    . 
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As Brandt et al. (2004), for example, explain, relation (36) also holds under incomplete markets 
as long as we interpret 1tm   and 
*
1tm   as the minimum variance (log) discount factors  That is, an 
infinite number of discount factors satisfy the first-order conditions given by (29) and (31) and 
their Foreign counterparts.  But all of those discount factors can be set equal to the respective 
minimum variance discount factors, 1tm   or 
*
1tm  , plus white-noise error terms. 
 Substituting into equation (35), we get: 
(37) *1 1 12 (var var )t t t t tm m    . 
The risk premium is determined for the investor with minimum-variance discount factor by the 
covariance of the real exchange rate with the discount factor, but the log of the real rate of 
depreciation in turn is equal to the log of the relative discount factors, giving us (37). 
 Following the discussion in section 3.1, we can see that a delicate set of conditions on the 
stochastic discount factors must be met in order to generate our finding that cov( , ) 0 dt tr  and 
cov( , ) 0 dt tr .  On the one hand, the representative agent models have been designed so that 
var( ) var( ) t t .  This requires that *1 1 12 (var var )   t t t t tm m  respond to exogenous state 
variables more than *1 1 1( )     t t t t t tE d E m m .  However, section 3.1 demonstrates that the 
finding that cov( , ) 0 dt tr  requires there be a persistent factor that invokes a smaller response 
in t  than in t .  In section 3.3, we survey some recent models to illustrate these difficulties. 
 The approach to explaining the data puzzles examined in this section relies on some 
relationships that hold under very general conditions.  As Cochrane (2005) and Cochrane et al. 
(2006) emphasize, the first of the two key building blocks, equations (29) and (31), are simply 
no-arbitrage conditions.  They do not require rational expectations or efficient markets, for 
example.  Violations of those assumptions only affect the stochastic discount factors.  The 
second building block, (36), could be a strong condition if that were interpreted to hold for all 
Home and Foreign agents, because it requires complete markets.  But if we reinterpret the 
stochastic discount factors to refer to particular agents – the ones with minimum-variance 
stochastic discount factors – then the underlying building blocks of this model are quite general.  
As Backus et al. (2010) say, “It is almost a tautology that we can represent exchange rates as 
ratios of nominal pricing kernels in different currency units: It is less a tautology that we can 
write down sensible stochastic processes for variables that are consistent with the carry trade 
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evidence.”  Even harder is to reconcile both the carry trade evidence and the evidence on the 
level risk premium.  Focusing only on the stochastic discount factors and their statistical 
properties may be an unproductive approach, or at least an approach that does not provide 
enough insight. The required conditions are delicate and necessitate some strong restrictions 
between the parameters of preferences (which help determine the coefficients 1g , 2g , 1a  and 2a
) and the dynamic behavior of the economy (which helps determine the volatility of the 
stochastic discount factors, as determined by 1t  and 2t .)   
 
3.3  Models of foreign exchange risk premium based on the stochastic discount factor  
In this section, we examine models of the risk premium, t , that are based on specifications of 
the stochastic discount factors derived from underlying models of preferences.  In particular, 
Verdelhan (2010) builds a model based on the Campbell-Cochrane (1999) specification of 
external habit persistence to explain the familiar uncovered interest parity puzzle.  Also, Bansal 
and Shaliastovich (2010) and Backus, Gavazzoni, Telmer and Zin (2010) demonstrate how the 
“long-run risks” model based on Epstein-Zin (1989) preferences can account for the forward-
premium anomaly.  We will see, however, that neither model is able to account for the empirical 
findings of Section 2 of this paper, principally because they are designed to account for the 
finding that var( ) var( ) t t .  
 Before proceeding to models of the discount factor based explicitly on a specification of 
preferences, it is worthwhile to highlight some points demonstrated by Backus, Foresi, and 
Telmer’s (2001) study of affine pricing models.  The models that are considered there encompass 
those of, for example, Frachot (1996) and Bakshi and Chen (1997).  Backus et al. take an 
adaptation of Duffie and Kan’s (1996) general class of affine models to a discrete-time setting 
appropriate for examining the interest parity puzzle.  The starting point is the specification of 
state variables, which are assumed to follow independent stochastic processes: 
(38) 1/21 1(1 )it i i i t i it itz z z         ,  
where 0 1i  , i , and (0,1)it NID : .  In turn, the log of the discount factors, 1tm   and * 1tm  , 
are assumed to be linear functions of these state variables. 
 Backus et al. demonstrate the difficulties in explaining for the interest parity anomaly in 
this setting.  They show an impossibility result – if we insist that interest rates are always 
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positive, then we cannot account for the negative correlation of 1td   and 
d
tr .  Moreover, if we are 
willing to allow for a small probability of negative interest rates, these models still have troubles 
matching such things as the unconditional distribution of interest rates and exchange rates, and 
the slope of the yield curve. 
The point to be made here is that the models that Backus et al. consider that are able to 
match the interest parity puzzle all are constructed so that the loading of the risk premium on the 
state variable is greater than the loading of expected changes in the exchange rate, so they run 
afoul of the problems discussed earlier in this section.     
First Backus et al. lay out an “independent factors” model of the discount factors: 
(39) 2 2 1/ 2 1/ 21 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1(1 / 2) ( 1 / 2)t t t t t t tm z z z z                
(40) * 2 2 1/ 2 1/ 21 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 1 2 2 1 1(1 / 2) ( 1 / 2)t t t t t t tm z z z z                
The interest differential is given by 2 1
d
t t tr z z  .  The risk premium is 2 21 1 2 2   t t tz z .  Backus 
et al. consider the symmetric case of 1 2  , which gives us 21 1 2( )  t t tz z .  In this case, 
effectively there is a single factor driving the interest differential and the risk premium, 1 2t tz z , 
which we have seen cannot reproduce our finding that cov( , ) 0dt tr    and cov( , ) 0dt tr   .   
Moreover, * 1 1( )    t t t tE m m 21 1 2( 1 / 2)( )  t tz z .    Backus et al. show that to 
account for the finding that cov( , ) 0 dt tr , it must be the case that 211 / 2 0   .  We see that 
the response of t  to the state variable is smaller in absolute value than the response of t .  That 
is, 2 21 11 / 2    .  If the symmetry assumption is not imposed then we can view this as a 
genuine two-factor model of the interest differential and risk premium.  However, this model still 
cannot account for cov( , ) 0dt tr    because it is designed so that the expected discount factors 
respond less to the exogenous state variables than the variance of the discount factors.   
The second model considered is the “interdependent factors” model: 
(41) 2 * 2 1/ 2 1/ 21 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 1(1 / 2) ( / 2)t t t t t t tm z z z z                 
(42) * * 2 2 1/ 2 1/ 21 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 2 2 1( / 2) (1 / 2)t t t t t t tm z z z z               . 
The expected real rate of depreciation in this model is * 2 21 2 1 2[1 ( ) / 2]( )     t tz z , and the risk 
premium is 2 21 2 1 2[( ) / 2]( )  t tz z .  Again, this is effectively a one-factor model for the expected 
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rate of depreciation and risk premium.  If it is to account for cov( , ) 0 dt tr  the absolute value of 
the response of t  to 1 2t tz z  must be smaller than the reaction of  t , so cannot account for our 
empirical results. 
 Even though these affine models are relatively unconstrained because they do not 
generate the stochastic discount factors from an underlying equilibrium model of utility 
maximization, they still are still inconsistent with having both cov( , ) 0dt tr    and 
cov( , ) 0dt tr   .     
 Ultimately, we would like to understand the excess return in the context of an equilibrium 
model, in which the discount factor is generated from the marginal utility of household/investors.  
Recent papers accomplish this goal using non-standard preferences.  Verdelhan (2010) builds a 
model of the stochastic discount factor based on Campbell-Cochrane preferences, and Bansal 
and Shaliastovich (2009) and Backus, Gavazzoni, Telmer and Zin (2010)  show how a model of 
the discount factor based on Epstein-Zin preferences can explain the uncovered interest parity 
puzzle.   
 These papers directly extend equilibrium closed-economy models to a two-country open-
economy setting.  The closed economy models assume an exogenous stream of endowments, 
with consumption equal to the endowment.  The open-economy versions assume an exogenous 
stream of consumption in each country.  These could be interpreted either as partial equilibrium 
models, with consumption given but the relation between consumption and world output 
unmodeled.  Or they could be interpreted as general equilibrium models in which each country 
consumes an exogenous stream of its own endowment and there is no trade between countries.  
Under the latter interpretation, the real exchange rate is a shadow price, since in the absence of 
any trade in goods, there can be no trade in assets that have any real payoff. 
 In both studies, the consumption streams are taken to follow unit root processes, as in the 
closed economy analogs, but with no assumption of cointegration.  That implies that relative 
consumption levels and real exchange rates have unit roots, implications which do not have 
strong empirical support.  However, relative real interest differentials and excess returns in these 
models are stationary.  The moments that are of concern to us, cov( , ) dt tr  and cov( , ) dt tr , are 
well defined, and the analysis of the necessary conditions for cov( , ) 0 dt tr  and cov( , ) 0 dt tr  
of section 3.1 applies.   
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 In Verdelhan (2010) there are two symmetric countries.  The objective of Home 
household i is to maximize 
(43) 1,
0
( ) /(1 )jt i t j t j
j
E C H    

  , 
where   is the coefficient of relative risk aversion, and tH  represents an external habit.  tH  is 
defined implicitly by defining the “surplus”,  ln ( ) /t t t ts C H C  , where tC  is aggregate 
consumption, and ts  is assumed to follow the stochastic process: 
(44) 1 1(1 ) ( )( )t t t t ts s s s c c g         , 0 1  . 
Here,   and s  are parameters, and ln( )t tc C  is assumed to follow a simple random walk: 
(45) 1 1t t tc g c u    , where 21 . . . (0, )tu i i d N  : . 
( )ts  represents the sensitivity of the surplus to consumption growth, and is given by: 
(46) 1( ) 1 2( ) 1t ts s sS
     , when maxts s , 0 elsewhere. 
The log of the stochastic discount factor is given by: 
(47)  1 1ln( ) ( 1)( ) (1 ( ))( )t t t t tm g s s s c c g              
When the parameters S  and maxs  are suitably normalized, Verdelhan shows we can write 
the expected rate of depreciation as: 
(48) *(1 )( )     t t ts s , 
where *ts  is the foreign surplus.  The excess return is given by: 
(49) 2 2 2 *( / )( )t t tS s s     . 
 Under the assumption of Verdelhan (2010) that   2 2 21 /     S , this model can 
account for the empirical finding of cov( , ) 0 dt tr .  However, this assumption that the risk 
premium responds more to the current state, *t ts s , than the expected depreciation will not allow 
us to account for cov( , ) 0 dt tr . 
 Bansal and Shaliastovich (2010) apply the “long-run risks” model to the uncovered 
interest parity puzzle.  In each country, households are assumed to have Epstein-Zin (1989) 
preferences.  The Home agent’s utility is defined by the recursive relationship: 
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(50)   1//1(1 )t t t tU C E U            . 
In this relationship,   measures the patience of the consumer, 1   is the degree of relative risk 
aversion, and 1/(1 )  is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution.  Bansal and Shaliastovich 
focus on the case of   , which corresponds to the case in which agents prefer an early 
resolution of risk, and in which the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is greater than one, 
0 1  .   
 Like Verdelhan, Bansal and Shaliastovich assume an exogenous path for consumption in 
each country.  In the Home country (with ln( )t tc C ): 
(51) 1 1
x
t t t t tc c l u      . 
The conditional expectation of consumption growth is given by tl  .  The component tl  
represents a persistent consumption growth modeled as a first-order autoregression: 
(52) 1 1
l
t l t t tl l w    . 
Conditional variances are stochastic and follow first-order autoregressive processes: 
(53) 1 1(1 )
u
t u u u t u tu u          
(54) 1 1(1 )
w
t w w w t w tw w         . 
The innovations, 1
x
t  , 1lt  , 1ut  , and 1wt   are assumed to be uncorrelated within each country, 
distributed . . . (0,1)i i d N , but each shock may be correlated with its Foreign counterpart. 
 When the first-order conditions are log-linearized (as in Hansen, Heaton, and Li (2005)), 
the following expression emerges for the log of the stochastic discount factor: 
(55) 1 1 1 1 1
r r r r x r l r u r w
t l t u t w t x t t l t t u u t w w tm l u w u w                          . 
The parameters in this log-linearization take some space to define, but these parameters are 
crucial) for this model’s ability to explain the data (with the exception of  , whose complicated 
definition we skip): 
 1rl     ( ) / 2ru       2( ) / 2rw l       
   1rx          ( )rl l             ( )ru u                ( )rw w        
 /(1 )l l     / 2(1 )u u      2 / 2(1 )w l w       
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 Bansal and Shaliastovich assume that the long-run expected growth component of 
consumption, tl , is the same in the Home and Foreign countries on the grounds that long-run 
growth prospects are nearly identical across countries.17  Under this assumption, Bansal and 
Shaliastovich find: 
(56) *( )  rt u t tu u  
(57)  2 *( ) / 2 ( )rt x t tu u    
 Bansal and Shaliastovich (2010) assume agents have a preference for early resolution of 
risk,   , and that the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is greater than one, which 
requires 0 1  .  As Bansal and Shaliastovich (2010) explain, these parameter choices are 
needed in order for this model to account for variance asset pricing facts, such as the term 
structure of interest rates.18  When 0  , the model can generate cov( , ) 0 dt tr .  But this 
restriction then implies  20 ( ) / 2  r ru x , so expected depreciation is less volatile than the risk 
premium.  Again, a parameter restriction like this will not allow us to explain cov( , ) 0 dt tr .  
 Backus et al. (2010) do not impose the restriction that long-run expected growth in the 
Home country, tl , is identically equal to the corresponding variable in the Foreign country, 
*
tl .  
In this case, equations (56) and (57) generalize: 
(58) * * *( ) ( ) ( )        r r rt l t t u t t w t tl l u u w w  
(59)    2 * 2 *( ) / 2 ( ) ( ) / 2 ( )r rt x t t l t tu u w w      . 
 Our discussion in section 3.1 shows that a model in which dtr  and t  are determined by 
at least two factors has the potential for reconciling the findings that cov( , ) 0 dt tr  and 
cov( , ) 0 dt tr .  A necessary condition is that the risk premium, t , have a smaller response to 
one of the factors than the expected rate of depreciation, t .  The sign restriction required to give 
us cov( , ) 0 dt tr  is 0   and 0 1  , but in this case the coefficients on *t tu u  and *t tw w  
in the risk premium equation (59) are larger in absolute value than the coefficients in the 
                                                 
17  As noted above, Bansal and Shaliastovich do not assume cointegration of the consumption processes, so shocks 
to the level of consumption in each country result in permanent level differences. 
18 See Bansal and Yaron (2004). 
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equation for expected depreciation, (58).  This can be seen because under these restrictions, 
0 ru , 0 rw , 2( ) / 2 (1 2 ) / 2 0r ru x          and 2 2( ) / 2 ( ) / 2 0r rw l l          . 
 The underlying difficulty with the representative agent models is that they have been 
designed to account for the empirical observation that var( ) var( ) t t .  That relationship must 
hold, as Fama (1984) pointed out, for cov( , ) 0 dt tr .  In order to account for this relationship, 
the literature has engineered models in which t  and  t  react to the same exogenous factors, but 
t  reacts more.  In other words, preferences are specified so that if we have 1 1 2 2   t t ta a  and 
1 1 2 2   t t tg g , the models are designed so that the absolute values of 1g  and 2g  are greater 
than the absolute values of 1a  and 2a , respectively.  We showed, however, that to account for 
our finding that cov( , ) 0 dt tr , we need one of the ig  to be smaller in absolute value than the 
corresponding ia .  The assumptions that are built in to account for a volatile risk premium 
preclude the possibility that cov( , ) 0 dt tr . 
 
4. Other Issues  
4.1 Whose price index? 
The empirical approach taken in section 2 requires taking a stand on the appropriate price index 
used to deflate nominal returns for the Home and Foreign investor.  In each country, we deflated 
nominal returns using the consumer price index measure of inflation.  The theory of the risk 
premium discussed in section 3.3, however, applies (for example) to the mythical investor that 
has the minimum variance stochastic discount factor.  If markets are not complete, it is not 
possible to identify the appropriate investor, so perhaps it is too presumptuous to assume these 
investors deflate using the CPI of their respective countries.  That is, perhaps our empirical 
approach has gone astray just because it is not using the appropriate price deflator. 
 However, Engel (1993,1999) presents evidence that there is very little within-country 
variation in prices compared to the variation of the real exchange rate, at least for the U.S. 
relative to other advanced countries.  The real exchange rate is given by *t t t tq s p p   .  In turn 
each log price index is a weighted average of individual consumer goods prices: 
1
N
t i it
i
p w p

 , 
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* * *
1
N
t i it
i
p w p

 .  The papers show, in essence, that there is very high correlation between 
*
t it its p p   for almost all goods, and these are very highly correlated with tq .  On the other 
hand, relative prices of goods within a country, it jtp p , generally have much lower variance 
than *t it its p p  . The implication is that if we consider price indexes that use different weights 
than the CPI weights, the constructed real exchange rate will still be highly correlated with tq . 
This suggests that there probably is not much to be gained by ascribing some other price 
index to the investor with the minimum variance stochastic discount factor.  That is, changing 
the weights on the goods in the price index is unlikely to have much effect on the measurement 
of real returns on Home and Foreign assets for Home and Foreign investors. 
 
4.2 The method when real exchange rates are non-stationary  
If the real exchange rate is non-stationary, the empirical method used here can be adapted.  The 
forward iteration that is the foundation of the empirical study,  limt t t j t tjq E q R    , does 
not require that the real exchange rate be stationary.  Instead, we could measure  lim t t jj E q   as 
the permanent component of the real exchange rate.  The level risk premium, t , could then be 
constructed as the sum of the prospective real interest rate, tR , and the transitory component of 
the real exchange rate,  limt t t jjq E q  . 
Section 2.1 presented evidence that the real exchange rate is stationary, so there is no 
permanent component.  Another approach, potentially, is to measure the permanent component 
using the Beveridge-Nelson (1981) decomposition, or some related method.19  However, Engel 
(2000) discusses the problem of near observational equivalence of stationary and non-stationary 
representations of the real exchange rate.  Suppose the real exchange rate is the sum of a pure 
random walk component, t , and a transitory component, t .  Engel (2000) argues, based on an 
economic model and evidence from disaggregated prices, that it is plausible that U.S. real 
exchange rates contain a transitory component that itself is very persistent (though stationary) 
                                                 
19  See Morley, Nelson, and Zivot (2003) for a discussion of the relationship between the Beveridge-Nelson 
decomposition and more restrictive state-space decompositions. 
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and very volatile (high innovation variance.)  There may be a random walk component related to 
the relative price of nontraded goods, but this component has a low innovation variance.  The 
transitory component, t , dominates the forecast variance of real exchange rates even for 
reasonably long horizons because it is so persistent and volatile. 
In this case, there are two dangers in trying to separate a transitory component from the 
permanent component.  On the one hand, even if the real exchange rate were stationary, so that 
0t  , the econometrician may not reject a random walk because of the high persistence of t .  
The permanent-transitory decomposition might mistakenly determine that there is a permanent 
component that accounts for most of the variation of the real exchange rate, with little role for a 
transitory component. 
The other danger is the opposite – that the econometrician uses powerful enough methods 
to detect the stationarity of t , but does not tease out the random-walk component, t .  In this 
case, the econometrician might conclude that all movements in the real exchange rate are 
transitory (though quite persistent).   
We have rejected a unit root in the real exchange rate, and so conclude that there is only a 
t  component.  However, if the t  component has such innovation variance that it is 
undetectable, then for our purposes it is reasonable to measure the transitory component, t , by 
the actual real exchange rate.  If Engel’s (2000) characterization of U.S. real exchange rate 
dynamics is correct, then there is not much to be gained by trying to undertake a permanent-
transitory decomposition, and analyzing the transitory component rather than the actual real 
exchange rate. 
 
4.3 The term structure  
There are two possible ways to see connections between this study and studies of the term 
structure.  First, is there a relationship between the findings here, and those of Alexius (2001) 
and Chinn and Meredith (2004) that interest-parity holds better at long horizons using long-term 
interest differentials?  (Note that Bekaert, Wei, and Xing (2007) do not find evidence to support 
this claim.)  The answer is no, not directly.  Our study does not derive any relationship between 
long-term interest rates and exchange rate changes.  It is critical to realize that the prospective 
real interest rate, tR , is not a long-term rate but instead an infinite sum of expected short-term 
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rates.  The two differ because long-term interest rates incorporate a term premium.  Our study 
has not offered any insights into the relationship between the term premium and exchange 
rates.20 
 Another connection is that there is an analogy to the uncovered interest parity puzzle in 
the term structure literature.  The long-short yield differential can predict excess returns.  
However, the literature on the term structure does not have evidence such as that in Figure 2 – 
that the expected excess return reverses signs at some horizon.  We can draw an analogy between 
the Fama regression for exchange rates and a version of the empirical work that establishes the 
term structure anomaly.  Let ,t np  be the log of the price of a bond with n periods to maturity at 
time t, that has a prayoff of one (in levels) at maturity.  If an investor holds that bond for one 
period, the return is 1, 1 ,t n t np p   .  The expected excess return is given by 1, 1 ,bt t t n t n tE p p r    
, where tr  is the return on a one-period bond.  The yield to maturity of the bond with n periods to 
maturity is given by , , /t n t ny p n  .  Then consider the regression: 
(60) 1, 1 , , 1
1 ( )
1t n t n t n t t
y y y r u
n
         . 
If the expectations hypothesis of the term structure held, we would find 0   and 1  .  
Instead, the empirical literature tends to find 1  , and sometimes 0  .21  Equation (60) is 
equivalent to: 
(61)   1, 1 , , 1(1 )( )t n t n t t n t tp p r y r u           , 
where ( 1)n     , and ( 1)t tu n u    .  The expected value at time t of the left-hand side of 
this regression is bt , so when 1   which implies ,cov( , ) 0  bt t t ntr y .  This is analogous to 
the finding in the foreign exchange literature that cov( , ) 0 dt tr .  
 We can rewrite the equation for the risk premium and iterate forward to get: 
(62) 
1 1
,
0 0
n n
b
t n t t j t t j
j j
p E r E   
 
    . 
                                                 
20  To be sure, many papers, such as those of Verdelhan (2010) and Bansal and Shaliastovich (2010) build models 
that are meant to account for both the term premium and the uncovered interest parity puzzle. 
21 See for example Campbell and Shiller (1991) and Dai and Singleton (2002). 
  35
The equivalent to our finding in foreign exchange markets that cov( , ) 0dt tr    would be 
evidence that 
1
,
0
cov( , ) 0
n
b
t t nt t t j
j
r y E  

  .  Just as cov( , ) 0 dt tr  requires cov( , ) 0  dt t j tE r  for 
some j, a necessary condition for 
1
,
0
cov( , ) 0 

 n bt t j t t nt
j
E r y  is that ,cov( , ) 0   bt t j t n tE r y  for 
some j.  However, so far such evidence has not been established in the term structure literature. 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
When a country’s interest rate is relatively high, the country’s short-term bonds tend to have a 
higher return than their counterpart in another country, at least among the U.S.-G7 country pairs.  
At the same time, when that country’s interest rate is high, its currency tends to be very strong – 
stronger than would be implied under uncovered interest parity.  The first empirical regularity 
suggests that the returns on the high-interest rate currency incorporate a risk premium, but the 
second empirical finding suggests the opposite – that the overall effect of currency risk is to 
strengthen the high-interest rate currency.  These two facts are difficult to understand by looking 
only at the behavior of a particular risk-averse agent in each country.  Section 3 demonstrates the 
difficulties to this approach.     
There have been several recent studies that attempt to build theoretical models to account 
for the uncovered interest parity that do not rely on modeling the preferences of agents, but 
instead model the interaction of more than one group of agents.  These papers build models that 
are designed to explain the first empirical fact – the uncovered interest rate parity puzzle.   
Frankel and Froot (1990) introduce a model with two groups of agents, chartists and 
fundamentalists, each following ad hoc behavioral rules.  The chartists base their asset choice on 
extrapolation of the exchange rate returns from the past, while the fundamentalists form their 
expectations based on a model of macroeconomic fundamentals.  Neither group of agents have 
expectations that are rational – the fundamentalists expectations do not take into account the 
effect of the chartists on the equilibrium exchange rate. 
Alvarez, Atkeson and Kehoe (2008) build a two-country model in which the fraction of 
agents in each country that participate in financial markets varies over time.  In each country, 
agents are constrained to use their own local currency to purchase their consumption good which 
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is also produced locally.  In asset markets, agents can trade interest earning bonds denominated 
in their own currency for interest earning foreign currency bonds.  They can also trade currencies 
in the asset market.  The household is split into two parts – one that deals in the goods market 
and the other that deals in the asset market.  For a fixed cost each period, the household can 
transfer money from the asset market to the goods market to be used for goods purchases.  The 
fraction of households that transfer money each period is endogenous in equilibrium, and 
depends on the money growth rate.  The risk premium in this model is linked to the variance of 
the stochastic discount factor of the “active” households – the ones that have paid the fixed cost 
to transfer money between asset and goods markets.   
 The model of Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2010) in which some agents are slow to adjust 
their portfolio produces dynamics that accord with some of the empirical findings of this paper.  
In the model, there is a group of agents that does not change its portfolio when the state of the 
economy changes.  Portfolios adjust only when new agents enter the financial market in the 
overlapping generation model developed here.  When the Home short-term interest rate is high, 
the Home currency appreciates, but only new entrants to the market choose portfolios based on 
the higher short-term interest rate.  Over time, more agents enter the market, and the currency 
then is expected to appreciate further for several months before depreciating.   
None of these papers explicitly delineates how the level of the real exchange rate is 
related to interest rates because they are primarily concerned with the short-run excess returns.  
However, the mechanism in these papers seems intuitively to be incompatible with our findings 
that the high-interest rate currency has a low level risk premium.  These models essentially rely 
on underreaction to explain the exchange rate dynamics in response to an interest rate increase.  
When the interest rate rises, one group of agents does not react – the chartists in Frankel and 
Froot, and the inactive agents in Alvarez et al. and in Bacchetta and van Wincoop.  The second 
group of agents does not take full advantage of the profit opportunity that might arise, either 
because this group is itself not fully rational (the fundamentalists in Frankel and Froot) or 
because it is risk averse (the active agents in Alvarez et al. and Bacchetta and van Wincoop.)  
These dynamics imply that in the short run, the currency appreciates less than it would if all 
agents were fully active.  Apparently, the models cannot account for the fact that the currency 
initially appreciates more than it would under uncovered interest parity, which is a key finding of 
this paper.  Bachetta and van Wincoop do compare the dynamics of the real exchange rate in 
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their model compared to one in which all the portfolios are actively managed.  The currency 
never appreciates in their model at any horizon as much as it would under active management, so 
the model does not deliver the key fact that the high-interest rate currency incorporates a level 
risk premium that strengthens the currency beyond its no-risk-premium level.   Since none of the 
papers presents directly the implications of their models for the statistics derived in this paper, it 
is not clear how they perform in this regard, but at an intuitive level they do not seem well 
equipped to deal with the level risk premium puzzle. 
Several recent papers have explored the implications for rare, large currency 
depreciations for the uncovered interest parity puzzle.  Farhi and Gabaix (2009) present a full 
general equilibrium model of rare disasters and real exchange rates.  Their model implies that 
when the Home real interest rate is high, the Home currency is weak in real terms, and so cannot 
account for the levels puzzle presented here.22  This correlation occurs during “normal times” in 
their model – the anticipation of a future disaster leads to a simple positive correlation between 
the real interest differential and the real exchange rate.  Nonetheless, there are two caveats that 
must be considered in light of Farhi and Gabaix and the related literature.  The first is that if rare 
disasters are important, than the linear VAR technology used in this paper may not correctly 
capture the stochastic process for real exchange rates and real interest rates.  Farhi et al. (2009) 
and Burnside et al. (2010a) extract information from options to infer expectations about rare 
large movements in exchange rates.  Moreover, if these large rare events are important, then the 
lognormal approximations that lie behind our analysis of the risk premium in sections 3.3 and 3.4 
are not correct.  Higher order cumulants matter for the risk premium in that case.23   
 It may be that it is necessary to abandon the assumption that all agents have fully rational 
expectations.  Some version of the model proposed by Hong and Stein (1999) may account for 
the empirical results uncovered here, which perhaps could be described as a combination of 
overreaction and momentum trading.  That is, the short-term behavior of the real exchange rate 
under high interest rates incorporates overreaction in that the currency appreciates more than it 
would under interest parity.  But perhaps momentum trading leads to expectations of further 
appreciation in the short run when the interest rate is high.  Burnside et al. (2010b), Gourinchas 
                                                 
22 See also Guo (2009), Gourio et al. (2010) and Gourinchas et al. (2010). 
23 See Martin (2010). 
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and Tornell (2004), Ilut (2010), Li and Tornell (2008) are recent approaches that have relaxed 
the assumption of full rationality in some way.   
 Finally, Table 3b may contain a clue toward a model that helps to resolve the empirical 
puzzles.  In that table, we find that an increase in Home relative to Foreign expected inflation 
tends to be associated with an expected real appreciation of the Home currency, holding the real 
interest differential constant.  This regularity for the G7 country pairs is very different than what 
has been found to hold in relatively high inflation emerging economies.24  In those countries, 
higher expected inflation in a country tends to be reflected in a higher expected nominal currency 
depreciation and a higher local nominal interest rate.  The net effect is to make uncovered 
interest parity, in nominal terms, hold better empirically for emerging economies than developed 
countries.  To contrast, here we find that higher expected Home inflation leads to an 
appreciation, not a depreciation, of the Home currency.  Moreover, this expected appreciation is 
in real terms, and does not work through the effect on the current real interest differential (since 
the regression controls for the latter variable.)  This suggests some sort of interaction between 
monetary policy and real exchange rates, but the connection to excess returns is not 
straightforward.   
 High real interest rates tend to strengthen a currency.  That is common wisdom in foreign 
exchange markets.  It fits the textbook description of exchange rate behavior, and is consistent 
with the empirical evidence in this paper and in other recent studies.  This regularity cannot be 
ignored when we try to explain the uncovered interest parity puzzle.  The high interest rate 
country may have short run excess returns (the uncovered interest parity puzzle), but it has a 
strong currency as well. 
                                                 
24  See Bansal and Dahquist (2000). 
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Appendix on bootstraps 
 
For both bootstraps, we construct pseudo-samples using the VAR estimates.25  For each 
pseudo-sample, we estimate the VAR.  We estimate all of the regression coefficients reported in Tables 
3A, 3B, 4 and 5, and calculate the Newey-West standard errors for each of those regressions.   
We repeat this exercise 1000 times.   
 The first confidence interval based on the bootstraps (the second confidence interval reported for 
each coefficient estimate) uses the coefficient estimates reported in the tables.  Let ˆ  refer to any of the 
coefficient estimates reported in Tables 3A, 3B, 4 and 5.  From the regressions on the pseudo-samples, we 
order the coefficient estimates from these 1000 replications from smallest to largest - 1ˆ  is the smallest 
and 1000ˆ be the largest. The confidence interval reported in the tables is based on (
950 50
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ[ ( ), ( )]         .  That is, the reported confidence interval corrects for the asymmetry in 
the distribution of ˆi  from the regressions on the pseudo-samples. 
Hansen (2010) argues that the first bootstrap method performs poorly when the ˆi  do not have a 
symmetric distribution.  Instead, he recommends the following procedure.    As above, let ˆ  refer to the 
estimated coefficient in the data, and ˆ  to be the Newey-West standard error in the data.  For each 
pseudo-sample i, we will record analogous estimates: ˆi  and ˆi . i  is defined by: 
ˆ ˆ
ˆ
i
i
i
  
 .  We 
arrange these i  from smallest to largest, so that 1  is the smallest and 1000  is the largest.  The third 
confidence interval reported for each coefficient estimate is given by 950 50ˆ ˆˆ ˆ[ , ]     .  It turns out 
that our two bootstraps generally produce very similar confidence intervals. 
  
                                                 
25 Initial values are set at the sample means.  We generate samples of 865 observations, then use the last 365 
observations, corresponding to the length of the time series we use in estimation. 
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Table 1 
Tests for Unit Root in Real Exchange Rates 
 
Univariate Unit Root Tests, 1973:3-2009:10 
Country ADF DF-GLS 
Canada -1.771 -1.077 
France -2.033 -2.036* 
Germany -2.038 -2.049* 
Italy -1.888 -1.914† 
Japan -2.071 -0.710 
United Kingdom -2.765† -2.076* 
G6 -2.052 -1.846† 
* significant at 5% level, † significant at 10% level 
 
Panel Unit Root Test, 1973:3-2009:10 
Model Estimated Coefficient 1% 5% 10% 
No Covariates -0.01705* -0.02199 -0.01697 -0.01485 
With Covariates -0.01703* -0.02174 -0.01697 -0.01455 
* significant at 5% level 
 
Table 2 
Fama Regressions: *1 , 1( )      t t s s t t s ts s i i u  
1979:6-2009:10 
 
Country ˆ s  90% c.i. ( ˆ s ) ˆ s  90% c.i. ( ˆ s ) 
Canada -0.045 (-0.250,0.160) -1.271 (-2.355,-0.186) 
France -0.028 (-0.346,0.290) -0.216 (-1.603,1.171) 
Germany 0.192 (-0.136,0.520) -1.091 (-2.583,0.401) 
Italy 0.032 (-0.325,0.389) 0.661 (-0.359,1.680) 
Japan 0.924 (0.504,1.343) -2.713 (-4.036,-1.390) 
United Kingdom -0.410 (-0.768,-0.051) -2.198 (-4.225,-0.170) 
G6 0.054 (-0.184,0.292) -1.467 (-3.164,0.231) 
Notes: (90 percent confidence intervals in parentheses) 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 3A 
Fama Regression in Real Terms: *1 , 1ˆ ˆ( )      t t q q t t q tq q r r u  
1979:6-2009:10 
 
 Model 1 Model 2
Country ˆ q  90% c.i.( ˆ q ) ˆ q  90% c.i.( ˆ q ) ˆ q  90% c.i.( ˆ q ) ˆ q  90% c.i.( ˆ q ) 
         
Canada 0.021 (-0.170,0.212)
(-0.159,0.166) 
(-0.135,0.157)
0.138 (-1.222,1.498) 
(-1.908,1.632) 
(-1.800,1.676) 
0.022 (-0.170,0.214)
(-0.159,0.168) 
(-0.136,0.165)
0.149 (-1.225,1.523) 
(-1.827,1.683) 
(-1.739,1.668) 
         
France -0.080 (-0.399,0.239)
(-0.281,0.052) 
(-0.294,0.054)
-0.576 (-2.269,1.117) 
(-2.240,0.719) 
(-2.602,1.125) 
-0.075 (-0.397,0.247)
(-0.286,0.064) 
(-0.290,0.064)
-0.526 (-2.265,1.213) 
(-1.964,0.733) 
(-2.485,1.260) 
         
Germany -0.042 (-0.341,0.257)
(-0.209,0.082) 
(-0.207,0.081)
-0.837 (-2.689,1.015) 
(-3.458,0.313) 
(-3.419,0.411) 
-0.043 (-0.341,0.255)
(-0.206,0.086) 
(-0.205,0.079)
-0.912 (-2.753,0.929) 
(-3.622,0.252) 
(-3.531,0.373) 
         
Italy 0.075 (-0.234,0.384)
(-0.149,0.274) 
(-0.124,0.261)
0.640 (-1.056,2.336) 
(-1.136,2.087) 
(-1.328,2.358) 
0.082 (-0.229,0.393)
(-0.141,0.278) 
(-0.116,0.276)
0.733 (-0.960,2.426) 
(-1.038,2.115) 
(-1.228,2.465) 
         
Japan 0.108 (-0.201,0.417)
(0.008,0.336) 
(0.015,0.326)
-1.314 (-2.860,0.232) 
(-3.300,0.254) 
(-3.441,0.379) 
0.110 (-0.197,0.418)
(0.006,0.325) 
(0.012,0.326)
-1.358 (-2.911,0.195) 
(-3.167,0.111) 
(-3.485,0.263) 
         
United Kingdom -0.241 (-0.603,0.121)
(-0.574,-0.074) 
(-0.611,-0.067)
-1.448 (-3.042,0.146) 
(-3.614,-0.127) 
(-3.846,-0.039) 
-0.228 (-0.588,0.132)
(-0.555,-0.073) 
(-0.588,-0.069)
-1.347 (-2.915,0.221) 
(-3.369,0.002) 
(-3.725,0.027) 
         
G6 -0.048 (-0.287,0.191)
(-0.210,0.080) 
(-0.202,0.068)
-0.933 (-2.548,0.682) 
(-2.932,0.409) 
(-3.005,0.527) 
-0.047 (-0.286,0.192)
(-0.189,0.082) 
(-0.181,0.077)
-0.914 (-2.511,0.683) 
(-2.909,0.447) 
(-2.861,0.588) 
Notes: (90 percent confidence interval in parentheses.  The first confidence interval is based on Newey-West.  The second two are bootstrapped.  The first reports 
a percentile interval bootstrap and the second a percentile-t interval bootstrap.  See Appendix for details.)  
  
Table 3B 
Fama Regression in Real Terms: * *1 1 2 1 1 , 1ˆˆ ˆ( ) ( )             t t q q t t q t t t q tq q r r E u  
1979:6-2009:10 
 
    Model 1   
Country ˆ q  90% c.i.( ˆ q ) 1ˆ q  90% c.i.( 1ˆ q ) 2ˆq  90% c.i.( 2ˆq ) 
       
Canada -0.001 (-0.210,0.208)
(-0.161,0.239) 
(-0.164,0.224)
-0.666 (-2.005,0.673)
(-2.279,1.385) 
(-1.973,1.089)
-3.362 (-5.318,-1.406)
(-5.364,-1.214) 
(-5.714,-1.330)
       
France -0.078 (-0.400,0.244)
(-0.320,0.076) 
(-0.310,0.045)
-0.600 (-2.316,1.116)
(-2.183,0.779) 
(-2.559,1.090)
-0.560 (-2.332,1.212)
(-2.462,1.816) 
(-2.424,1.548)
       
Germany 0.280 (-0.110,0.670)
(-0.092,0.631) 
(-0.046,0.675)
-0.598 (-2.422,1.226)
(-2.523,1.314) 
(-2.415,1.257)
-3.009 (-5.179,-0.839)
(-5.715,-0.197) 
(-5.702,-0.480)
       
Italy 0.020 (-0.335,0.375)
(-0.280,0.366) 
(-0.246,0.315)
0.581 (-1.192,2.354)
(-1.249,2.014) 
(-1.544,2.411)
-0.306 (-1.332,0.720)
(-1.499,1.200) 
(-1.390,0.996)
       
Japan 0.975 (0.465,1.485)
(0.510,1.527) 
(0.574,1.505)
-2.612 (-4.140,-1.084)
(-4.131,-0.890) 
(-4.029,-0.989)
-3.956 (-6.060,-1.852)
(-6.057,-1.889) 
(-5.955,-1.668)
       
U.K. -0.408 (-0.763,-0.053)
(-0.738,-0.096) 
(-0.746,-0.149)
-2.170 (-3.943,-0.397)
(-3.791,-0.448) 
(-3.918,-0.376)
-3.203 (-7.334,0.928)
(-5.486,-0.438) 
(-7.626,1.493)
       
G6 0.080 (-0.190,0.350)
(-0.143,0.271) 
(-0.132,0.268)
-1.299 (-3.102,0.504)
(-3.008,0.343) 
(-3.221,0.655)
-3.017 (-5.567,-0.467)
(-5.270,-0.335) 
(-5.844,-0.191)
 
    Model 2   
  
Country ˆ q  90% c.i.( ˆ q ) 1ˆ q  90% c.i.( 1ˆ q ) 2ˆq  90% c.i.( 2ˆq ) 
       
Canada 0.000 (-0.209,0.209)
(-0.162,0.250) 
(-0.154,0.233)
-0.642 (-1.983,0.699)
(-2.201,1.419) 
(-1.943,1.139)
-3.405 (-5.386,-1.424)
(-5.401,-0.874) 
(-5.851,-0.934)
       
France -0.074 (-0.398,0.250)
(-0.313,0.084) 
(-0.312,0.086)
-0.560 (-2.322,1.202)
(-2.034,0.794) 
(-2.476,1.300)
-0.631 (-2.350,1.088)
(-2.406,1.402) 
(-2.346,1.487)
       
Germany 0.267 (-0.121,0.655)
(-0.057,0.598) 
(-0.021,0.630)
-0.674 (-2.487,1.139)
(-2.711,1.102) 
(-2.577,1.146)
-2.900 (-5.058,-0.742)
(-5.586,-0.398) 
(-5.611,-0.674)
       
Italy 0.020 (-0.337,0.368)
(-0.276,0.382) 
(-0.254,0.343)
0.668 (-1.095,2.431)
(-1.149,2.091) 
(-1.409,2.424)
-0.351 (-1.387,0.685)
(-1.402,1.204) 
(-1.386,0.840)
       
Japan 0.961 (0.451,1.471)
(0.510,1.493) 
(0.551,1.484)
-2.635 (-4.173,-1.096)
(-4.119,-1.029) 
(-4.126,-0.964)
-3.881 (-5.977,-1.785)
(-5.920,-1.820) 
(-5.955,-1.668)
       
U.K. -0.407 (-0.761,-0.053)
(-0.711,-0.105) 
(-0.729,-0.148)
-2.154 (-3.922,-0.386)
(-3.750,-0.185) 
(-3.866,-0.176)
-3.247 (-7.325,0.831)
(-5.647,-0.586) 
(-7.720,1.685)
       
G6 0.081 (-0.190,0.352)
(-0.141,0.270) 
(-0.124,0.277)
-1.293 (-3.086,0.500)
(-3.020,0.353) 
(-3.168,0.564)
-3.034 (-5.589,-0.479)
(-5.240,-0.317) 
(-5.648,0.257)
Notes: (90 percent confidence interval in parentheses.  The first confidence interval is based on Newey-West.  The second two are bootstrapped.  The first reports 
a percentile interval bootstrap and the second a percentile-t interval bootstrap.  See Appendix for details.)
  
Table 4 
Regression of tq  on 
*ˆ ˆt tr r : * ,ˆ ˆ( )    t q q t t q tq r r u  
1979:6-2009:10 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Country ˆ q  90% c.i.( ˆ q ) ˆ q  90% c.i.( ˆ q ) 
     
Canada -48.517 (-62.15,-34.88) 
(-94.06,-31.41) 
(-140.54,-27.34) 
-48.962 (-62.73,-35.19) 
(-92.51,-33.11) 
(-139.93,-29.36) 
     
France -20.632 (-32.65,-8.62) 
(-44.34,-1.27) 
(-54.26,1.75) 
-20.388 (-32.42,-8.35) 
(-42.53,-3.73) 
(-52.83,-0.46) 
     
Germany -52.600 (-67.02.-38.18) 
(-85.97,-25.35) 
(-105.29,-19.38) 
-52.738 (-67.10,-38.37) 
(-85.87,-25.88) 
(-105.62,-19.06) 
     
Italy -39.101 (-51.92,-26.28) 
(-67.63,-16.36) 
(-90.01,-13.70) 
-39.550 (-52.46,-26.64) 
(-67.29,-17.78) 
(-87.39,-15.45) 
     
Japan -19.708 (-29.69,-9.72) 
(-42.01,-1.05) 
(-46.53,-4.33) 
-19.669 (-29.72,-9.61) 
(-42.79,-0.92) 
(-46.23,-3.94) 
     
United Kingdom -18.955 (-31.93,-5.98) 
(-40.19,-3.08) 
(-55.94,4.08) 
-18.387 (-31.01,-5.76) 
(-38.63,-3.61) 
(-52.82,4.95) 
     
G6 -44.204 (-55.60,-32.80) 
(-73.17,-23.62) 
(-82.87,-21.74) 
-44.032 (-55.34,-32.72) 
(-74.89,-22.06) 
(-82.93,-22.75) 
Notes: (90 percent confidence interval in parentheses.  The first confidence interval is based on Newey-West.  The 
second two are bootstrapped.  The first reports a percentile interval bootstrap and the second a percentile-t interval 
bootstrap.  See Appendix for details.)  
 
 
  
  
Table 5 
Regression of ˆ t  on *ˆ ˆt tr r : *ˆ ˆ ˆ( )       t t t tr r u  
1979:6-2009:10 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Country ˆ  90% c.i.( ˆ ) ˆ  90% c.i.( ˆ ) 
     
Canada 23.610 (15.12,32.10) 
(12.62,51.96) 
(11.96,63.71) 
24.192 (15.64,32.75) 
(13.35,53.16) 
(12.99,71.13) 
     
France 13.387 (1.06,25.72) 
(-2.56,36.25) 
(-6.98,42.40) 
14.045 (1.84,26.25) 
(0.80,35.39) 
(-3.60,41.27) 
     
Germany 34.722 (19.66,49.78) 
(9.34,57.59) 
(3.68,69.36) 
34.816 (19.77,49.87) 
(10.30,59.11) 
(5.701,73.54) 
     
Italy 27.528 (17.58,37.48) 
(14.98,48.32) 
(12.51,58.54) 
28.400 (18.40,38.40) 
(16.00,48.83) 
(13.26,57.41) 
   
Japan 15.210 (4.76,25.66) 
(-0.45,37.08) 
(0.91,38.87) 
15.208 (4.71,25.70) 
(-0.99,37.77) 
(1.50,38.48) 
     
United Kingdom 14.093 (0.33,27.86) 
(0.39,34.46) 
(-8.70,46.45) 
13.575 (0.17,26.98) 
(-0.11,33.13) 
(-8.70,44.32) 
     
G6 31.876 (20.62,43.13) 
(16.89,54.62) 
(16.78,60.89) 
31.876 (20.78,42.97) 
(17.39,55.49) 
(16.33,59.36) 
Notes: (90 percent confidence interval in parentheses.  The first confidence interval is based on Newey-West.  The 
second two are bootstrapped.  The first reports a percentile interval bootstrap and the second a percentile-t interval 
bootstrap.  See Appendix for details.): 
Figure 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The line labeled bRj plots estimates of Rj  from the regression * ,ˆ ( )      jt j Rj Rj t t R tR r r u  
The line labeled bQj plots estimates of Qj  from the regression * ,( )      jt j Qj Qj t t Q tq r r u  
The line labeled Model plots the regression coefficient of t jq   on 
*t tr r  implied by a class of models discussed in Section 3 
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Figures plot the slope coefficients of these regressions: 
brj refers to slope in * *1 1 ,ˆ ( ) ( )         jt t j t j rj rj t t r tE r r r r u  
bqj refers to slope in  *1 ,ˆ ( ) ( )        jt t j t j qj qj t t q tE q q r r u  
blj refers to slope in * ,1 ( )ˆ ( )           jj j t tt tt j r rE u  
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